Decoy state quantum key distribution with imperfect source by Huang, Anqi et al.
Quantum key distribution with distinguishable decoy states
Anqi Huang,1, 2, 3, ∗ Shi-Hai Sun,4, † Zhihong Liu,5 and Vadim Makarov6, 7
1Institute for Quantum Information & State Key Laboratory of High Performance Computing,
College of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, People’s Republic of China
2Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1 Canada
3Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1 Canada
4College of Science, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, People’s Republic of China
5College of Mechatronic Engineering and Automation,
National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, People’s Republic of China
6Russian Quantum Center and MISIS University, Moscow
7Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1 Canada
The decoy state protocol has been considered to be one of the most important methods to protect
the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) with a weak coherent source. Here we test two
experimental approaches to generating the decoy states with different intensities: modulation of
the pump current of a semiconductor laser diode, and external modulation by an optical intensity
modulator. The former approach shows a side-channel in the time domain that allows an attacker to
distinguish s signal state from a decoy state, breaking a basic assumption in the protocol. We model
a photon-number-splitting attack based on our experimental data, and show that it compromises the
system’s security. Then, based on the work of K. Tamaki et al. [New J. Phys. 18, 065008 (2016)],
we obtain two analytical formulas to estimate the yield and error rate of single-photon pulses when
the signal and decoy states are distinguishable. The distinguishability reduces the secure key rate
below that of a perfect decoy-state protocol. To mitigate this reduction, we propose to calibrate
the transmittance of the receiver (Bob’s) unit. We apply our method to three QKD systems and
estimate their secure key rates.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Unconditional security, or information theoretical se-
curity, is always the end goal of cryptography. It is
a challenging task for classical cryptography, which is
based on mathematical complexity. Luckily, quantum
cryptography, based on the basic principle of quantum
mechanics, provides a way to reach such terminal goal.
Taking advantage of conventional techniques from optical
communication and cutting-edge technologies from quan-
tum optics, some quantum cryptography primitives, such
as quantum key distribution (QKD) [1], quantum coin
tossing (QCT) [1], quantum digital signature (QDS) [2]
and quantum secret sharing (QSS) [3], have been im-
plemented [4–9]. Of these, QKD implementations are
relatively mature, have been demonstrated in a field en-
vironment [10–13] and commercialized [14].
However, along with QKD maturation, deviation of
the behaviour in implementation from the theoretical as-
sumptions has been explored. Such deviation might open
backdoors and be exploited by an eavesdropper (Eve).
Once any security assumptions are broken by Eve, she
could compromise theory-proved security and spy on the
secret key in practice. The feasibility and capability of
Eve’s attacks have been shown in various cases [15–24].
Similar vulnerability may occur in the other quantum
∗ angelhuang.hn@gmail.com
† shsun@nudt.edu.cn
cryptography implementations [7–9], since they employ
similar optical components and devices.
In practical quantum cryptography systems, a weak
coherent source (WCS) is widely used to replace the sin-
gle photon source. An inherent imperfection in WCS
is the emission of multiphoton pulses, which gives Eve
more than one copy of Alice’s quantum states. Then
Eve could perform the photon-number-splitting (PNS)
attack [25, 26], in which she blocks all single-photon
pulses, and keeps one photon from the multiphoton state.
Then she could get the entire final key after Alice and
Bob announce their basis choices. Note that a modified
PNS attack based on a beam splitter has been demon-
strated [27]. Thus, the danger of PNS attack is not
only theoretical, but also practical. Fortunately, decoy
state protocols [28–30] were proposed to beat such at-
tack, and have been implemented in many QKD sys-
tems [4, 12, 13, 31, 32]. They have also been employed
in other quantum cryptography systems [7, 9, 33, 34] to
guarantee their security.
Generally speaking, in the decoy state protocol, sig-
nal and decoy states only have different mean photon
numbers. Decoy states are used to estimate the detec-
tion gain and error rate of single-photon pulses in signal
states. If Eve could not distinguish the signal and de-
coy states, she would change the photon number in both
signal and decoy pulses during the PNS attack [25, 26].
Thus, she would disturb the yield and error rate of de-
coy states, which affects the estimation of single-photon
detection gain and error rate in signal states. It results
in a decrease of the secure key rate [30].
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2However, the essential assumption, indistinguishabil-
ity of the signal and decoy states, may not be guaran-
teed in practice. In fact, Eve might exploit practical
imperfections to find a side-channel which allows her to
distinguish the signal and decoy states. Then she could
perform different hacking strategies to keep the normal
statistic distributions, meanwhile spy some secret infor-
mation silently without being discovered. Several types
of source imperfections and corresponding attacks have
been shown in different QKD systems [20, 35–38]. Im-
portantly, the first quantum satellite also employs one
of such imperfect sources [39]. Recently, the security
of decoy-state QKD with a leaky source was proved by
K. Tamaki et al. in Ref. 38. According to their analysis,
the trace distance can be used to characterize the leaked
information due to the imperfection of source, which may
come from Alice’s imperfect state preparation or Eve’s
attack (such as the Trojan-horse attack [40–42]). Then
the key rate can be bounded with the trace distance, in
which the yield and error rate of single-photon pulses are
estimated by solving an optimization problem. In this
Article, based on the work of Ref. 38, we obtain two ana-
lytical formulas to estimate the yield and error rate of the
single photon pulses, which produce the secure key rate
given that the signal and decoy states are distinguish-
able. A further analysis shows that the key rate can be
improved by calibrating the transmittance of Bob’s opti-
cal devices (the calibrated method has also been used to
protect a single photon detector of Bob from the blinding
attack [43, 44]).
In this Article, we first recap the basic theory of decoy
state protocol in Sec. II. In Sec. III, we test experimen-
tally two intensity modulation methods: laser diode gain
switching by modulating its pump current, and external
intensity modulator connected after the laser diode. The
test of pump-current modulation shows a side-channel in
the time domain, which allows Eve to distinguish the sig-
nal state from the decoy state. We then model a PNS
attack that bypasses the decoy state protocol in Sec. IV.
By optimizing the attack’s time windows, Eve should be
able to eavesdrop the secret key successfully. On the
other hand, from Alice and Bob’s point of view, we give
a method to analyze the security of the decoy state pro-
tocol with imperfect source in Sec. V. Here the imperfect
source means that the signal state and decoy state are
partially distinguishable in any degrees of freedom. Two
analytic formulas are given to estimate the key rate un-
der such an imperfect source. To improve the secure key
rate, an advanced method with calibrated Bob is pro-
vided as well. Our method is based on the decoy state
protocol with three intensities (a signal state, a weak de-
coy state, and a vacuum state), which is the most widely
used setting. In Sec. VI, our method is applied to three
QKD systems to calculate their secure key rate versus
distance. We conclude in Sec. VII.
II. DECOY STATE PROTOCOL
As a fundamental theory of our research, we recap the
decoy state protocol first in this section. Here we take
the weak + vacuum decoy state protocol [45] as an exam-
ple to explain the basic idea of the decoy state protocol.
This simple one weak + vacuum decoy state protocol is
commonly used in Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD
system [1], as it provides the optimal key rate in the
case of only two decoy states [45]. The security analysis
in Secs. IV to VI also follows this decoy state model.
According to the analysis of Gottesman-Lo-
Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) [46], the key rate of
QKD with the WCS can be written as
R ≥ q{−QµH2(Eµ)f(Eµ) + Pµ1 Y µ1 [1−H2(eµ1 )]}. (1)
Here q = 1/2 for BB84 protocol (if one uses the efficient
BB84 protocol [47], q ≈ 1), the subscript µ means the
intensity of a signal state, Qµ (Eµ) is the total gain (error
rate) of the signal state, Y µ1 and e
µ
1 are the yield and
error rate of single-photon pulses, Pµ1 is the probability
of single-photon pulses, f(x) is the bidirectional error
correction efficiency, normally f(x) ≥ 1 with Shannon
limit f(x) = 1, and H2(x) = −x log 2(x)−(1−x) log 2(1−
x) is the binary Shannon information entropy.
In Eq. (1), Qµ and Eµ are directly obtained in an ex-
periment, and Pµ1 is known for a given source. Thus,
the major task of the decoy state is to tightly estimate
the lower bound of Y µ1 and upper bound of e
µ
1 . Note the
fact that, if the phase of the WCS is randomized from 0
to 2pi (the phase randomization assumption), the density
matrix of the WCS can be written as
ρω =
∞∑
n=0
Pωn |n〉〈n|, (2)
where ω = {µ, ν, 0} represents the average intensity of
pulse signal state µ, decoy state ν, and vacuum state
that is always 0. Pωn is the probability distribution of n-
photon number from the source with the intensity ω. For
the WCS, Pωn = e
−ωωn/n! . Without loss of generality,
we assume µ > ν. Thus, the total gain and error rate
can be written as
Qω =
∞∑
n=0
Pωn Y
ω
n ,
QωEω =
∞∑
n=0
Pωn Y
ω
n e
ω
n .
(3)
Here Y ωn (or e
ω
n) is the yield (or error rate) given that Al-
ice sends a n-photon pulse from the source with intensity
ω. Obviously, if Eve does not have any prior information
about the intensity of Alice’s pulse, we can assume that
Y µn = Y
ν
n = Yn,
eµn = e
ν
n = en.
(4)
Then the lower bound of Y1 and upper bound of e1 can be
estimated by solving the linear Eqs. (3) with weak + vac-
uum decoy states [45].
3III. INTENSITY MODULATION TEST
To evaluate the realization of the weak + decoy state
protocol, we test two intensity modulation methods. The
implementation of each has been obtained from a third
party, and is tested as supplied, without any tampering
or making adjustments.
The first method under testing is the pump-current
modulation, similar to Refs. 7 and 48. For the signal
and weak decoy states, different intensities are produced
by applying different pulses of pump current to a laser
diode. Thus, the laser diode directly emits optical pulses
with different intensities. The vacuum state is generated
by turning off the pump current. An optical attenua-
tor then applies a fixed attenuation to all the optical
pulses, to reach single-photon level. The second method
under testing is an external intensity modulator, similar
to Refs. 31, 49, and 50. Optical pulses could be produced
with a constant intensity from a laser diode first, and
then the different intensities of signal and decoy states
are modulated by an intensity modulator (IM). Similarly
to the former method, a fixed attenuator provides atten-
uation to the single-photon level.
Our intensity measurement of the optical pulses is
taken before the fixed attenuation is applied. The optical
pulses are measured by a photodetector (40 GHz band-
width) and an oscilloscope (33 GHz bandwidth), averag-
ing over & 5000 pulses. We obtain the normalized proba-
bility distribution of emitting photons over time which is
shown in Figs. 1(a) and 2. Although we measure the in-
tensity of classical optical pulses, the probability of emit-
ting single photon should follow the same distribution,
because constant attenuation is applied.
For the case of pump-current modulation, we measure
the intensities of signal and decoy states for the polariza-
tion state |H〉. Figure 1(a) clearly shows that the prob-
ability distributions of emitting the signal state and the
decoy state do not totally overlap. The main peaks of
these two distributions are mismatched. The signal state
emits earlier than the decoy state with high probability,
and has a secondary peak from 662 to 937 ps. Over the
same time interval, the probability distribution of the
decoy state drops to low values. The timing mismatch
of the signal state and the decoy state clearly violates
the basic assumption of indistinguishability in the decoy
state protocol. As we show numerically in Sec. IV, this
can be exploited by Eve to bypass the protection of the
decoy state protocol. However, the measured result of
external intensity modulation in Fig. 2 does not show a
measurable timing mismatch between signal and decoy
states. This is expected, because the pulse generation
and intensity modulation in this type of source are phys-
ically decoupled and performed by separate devices. As
long as there is no electrical crosstalk between the laser
diode driver and intensity modulator driver, no correla-
tion is expected. This is the case, as Fig. 2 shows.
To investigate the reason for timing mismatch in the
case of pump-current modulation, we measure the cur-
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Pump-current modulation for the laser
diode generating |H〉 polarization state. (a) Normalized in-
tensity distribution of the signal state and the decoy state
measured in the time domain. For ease of comparison, the
pulses are normalized to have the same area. The original
signal-to-decoy intensity ratio is 3:1 (µ = 0.6, ν = 0.2). Ws
and Wd indicate the typical time windows for Eve to conduct
PNS attack, as detailed in Sec. IV. (b) Laser-diode’s pump
current. The current is calculated from the measured voltage
across the laser diode module. The lasing threshold, 14 mA,
is shown as a line. The relative time alignment between (a)
and (b) is a guess.
rent flowing through the laser diode (Agilecom WSLS-
940010C4123). A differential probe with 30 GHz band-
width (Agilent N5445A) is used to measure the differen-
tial voltage V across the laser diode and its built-in serial
resistor Rs = 20 Ω. Since the laser diode forward voltage
Vd = 1.23 V is known from its test sheet, we can calcu-
late the pump current I = (V − Vd)/Rs. This calculated
current is shown in Fig. 1(b).
If the laser diode were pumped by a constant current,
any current above the lasing threshold Ith = 14 mA
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FIG. 2. (Color online) External intensity modulation. Nor-
malized intensity distribution of the signal state and the decoy
state measured in the time domain. For ease of comparison,
the pulses are normalized to have the same area.
(shown in the figure) would result in continuous-wave
(c.w.) laser emission. However, when the current is ini-
tially zero then rapidly increased above Ith, the diode
does not begin to lase instantly [51]. First, a certain
number of carriers has to be injected into the p-n junction
before the diode reaches population inversion, and that
takes time (the higher the current, the less time). Once
the population inversion is reached and the diode at-
tains light amplification condition, the few spontaneously
emitted photons present in the optical cavity need time
to amplify into a strong coherent light. This results in
a fraction-of-nanosecond delay between the application
of current and the start of strong light emission. In this
process, the population inversion and emitted light power
briefly overshoot the steady-state. They then undergo a
few oscillations with ∼ 100 ps period and eventually set-
tle at the steady-state c.w. level if the pump current con-
tinues [51]. However, if the pump current is interrupted,
as is the case with our device under test, the lasing stops.
As can be seen in Fig. 1, the signal state is produced by a
higher peak current pulse, the laser begins emitting light
earlier and has time to emit two light pulses (i.e., light
power oscillations) before the current stops. The decoy
state is produced by a lower peak current pulse, light
emission begins later and the laser only has time to emit
one light pulse. This physics of laser diode operation is
well-known to the manufacturers of pulsed laser diodes
(e.g., PicoQuant). However, the engineers who selected
this modulation method for the QKD system under our
test did not initially realise that it created a security
loophole.
While the mismatch might be reduced by adjusting
the timing and shape of the pump current between the
states, it is unlikely to be fully eliminated. The difference
TABLE I. Hacking strategy and corresponding yields.
PNS attack In the time windows
Outside the
time windows
Single-photon states Forward or blocka Block
Multiphoton states
Keep one photon and
forward or block othersa
Forward
Yield Y ωEven Z
ω
n
0 (n = 1)
Y ωn (n ≥ 2)
a Depends on the optimized yield Zωn in simulation.
in light pulse shapes is due to the physics of laser diode
operation. Further testing is needed to find how well the
mismatch can be controlled in a practical device.
IV. PNS ATTACK
In the case of pump-current modulation, because the
signal state and the decoy state are partially distinguish-
able in the time domain, the PNS attack becomes possi-
ble again. Here we consider a special PNS attack sum-
marized in Table I. Eve selects time windows Ws and Wd
to observe states sent by Alice. By properly setting the
intervals of Ws and Wd, Eve treats all states observed
in Ws (Wd) as the signal state (the decoy state). Then
she performs the PNS attack. For single-photon states,
Eve blocks or forwards those that are in the observation
windows, while blocks all of those that are out of the ob-
servation windows. Once the states contain two or more
photons, Eve keeps one photon and either blocks or for-
wards the rest of the photons to Bob in the observation
windows, but forwards all the photons to Bob when the
states are out of the windows. If Eve obtains photons in
both Ws and Wd, she randomly keeps photons in only
one window, and forwards the rest of photons to Bob.
By following the criteria of a successful attack pro-
posed in Ref. 20, the success ability of the above attack
could be analyzed. A successful attack lets Eve know
partial information about the final secret key. In other
words, Alice and Bob’s key remains partially insecure af-
ter post-processing. To show this, a lower bound of the
key rate under Alice and Bob’s estimation, Rl, and an
upper bound of the key rate under Eve’s attack, Ru, are
compared. If
Rl > Ru, (5)
the shared final key must be partially insecure and Eve
knows some amount of information. This is the result
Eve would like to reach in her attack.
The lower bound of the key rate is the one used in the
decoy state protocol [45]:
Rl = −QµH2(Eµ)f(Eµ) + Y µ1 µe−µ[1−H2(eµ1 )], (6)
which is consistent with Eq. (1) when we consider the
efficient BB84 protocol [47], q = 1. Here Y µ1 and e
µ
1
5are single-photon yield and error rate in the normal de-
coy state protocol. It is the secure key rate from Alice
and Bob’s point of view under the attack. Since Alice
and Bob do not know about Eve’s attack, the estimation
of the lower bound of Y µ1 and the upper bound of e
µ
1
still follows the weak + vacuum decoy protocol [45] with
the assumption of indistinguishability. The actual upper
bound of the key rate under the PNS attack [20] is
Ru = Y µEve1 µe
−µ, (7)
where Y µEve1 is the real overall yield of single photon
states under Eve’s attack. The goal of our attack is to
minimize the upper bound in Eq. (7) to satisfy inequal-
ity (5), while matching the value of Qω and even reaching
lower QBER than QωEω. Then the attack will remain
unnoticed.
Based on the measurement result in Fig. 1(a), Eve can
only partially distinguish the signal state and the decoy
state. In a certain observation window, we define the fol-
lowing guessing probability. The conditional probability
P (i
∣∣j) is defined as Eve guesses the state is i given Al-
ice actually sending the j state. Here i, j ∈ [s, d], which
means i or j is either the signal state, s, or the decoy
state, d. Thus, P (s
∣∣s) and P (d∣∣d) are the probabilities
of correct guess in Ws and Wd respectively, while P (s
∣∣d)
and P (d
∣∣s) are the probabilities of wrong guess in the
same windows.
As mentioned in the hacking strategy, once Eve ob-
serves multiphoton states in Ws or Wd, she keeps a single
photon and might forward or block the remaining pho-
tons to Bob. In order to maintain the statistics of Qω
and QωEω, Eve has to manipulate detection yield in the
observation windows from Y ωn to Z
ω
n as shown in Table I.
In the time window Ws (Wd), the yield is denoted as
Zµn (Z
ν
n). Please note that Eve is allowed to use a lower-
loss, or even lossless, channel, which means Zωn could be
greater than Y ωn . At the phase of decoy announcement in
QKD protocol, Bob classifies detection slots according to
Alice’s signal and decoy information. Thus, under Eve’s
attack, the yields Y ωEven actually should be recalculated
as the following. For the single-photon states, Eve fully
controls the yields, since the single-photon states outside
the time windows are blocked. Thus, Y ωEve1 are given by
Y µEve1 = P (s
∣∣s)Zµ1 + P (d∣∣s)Zν1 ,
Y νEve1 = P (s
∣∣d)Zµ1 + P (d∣∣d)Zν1 . (8)
For multiphoton states (n ≥ 2), Eve forwards the states
to Bob when these states are outside the observation win-
dows, so Y ωEven are given by
Y µEven = P (s
∣∣s)Zµn + P (d∣∣s)Zνn + [1−P (s∣∣s)−P (d∣∣s)]Y µn ,
Y νEven = P (s
∣∣d)Zµn + P (d∣∣d)Zνn + [1−P (s∣∣d)−P (d∣∣d)]Y νn .
(9)
Correspondingly, the overall gains of the signal state and
the decoy state are
QµEve = Y
µEve
0 e
−µ +
∞∑
n=1
Y µEven e
−µµ
n
n!
,
QνEve = Y
νEve
0 e
−ν +
∞∑
n=1
Y νEven e
−ν ν
n
n!
,
(10)
where Y ωEve0 are dark count rates under the attack. The
overall QBERs are given by
EµEveQµEve =
1
2
Y µEve0 e
−µ +
∞∑
n=1
1
2
P (d
∣∣s)Zνne−µµnn! ,
EνEveQνEve =
1
2
Y νEve0 e
−ν +
∞∑
n=1
1
2
P (s
∣∣d)Zµne−ν νnn! .
(11)
Here we consider an extreme case. A dark count intro-
duces error half the time. There is no error if signal and
decoy states are correctly distinguished by Eve or states
are outside the windows Ws and Wd. However, wrong
guess in Ws and Wd results in random clicks, which in-
troduces error half the time.
According to the standard decoy state protocol [45],
the normal overall gains should be
Qω = Y0 + 1− e−ηω, (12)
where Y0 is the dark count rate, and η is the total trans-
mittance of the QKD system. η is given by
η = ηBob10
−αL/10, (13)
where ηBob is the transmittance of Bob’s optical de-
vice, including detector efficiency, and α is the trans-
mittance of channel between Alice and Bob. Typically,
α = 0.21 dB/km for the commercial fibre at 1550 nm.
L is the length of channel. The normal overall QBER
should be
EωQω =
1
2
Y0 + edetector(1− e−ηω), (14)
where edetector is the probability that a photon goes to
erroneous detector, characterizing the alignment and sta-
bility of a QKD system.
To achieve a successful attack, the upper bound of the
key rate Ru should be minimized, which is equivalent to
minimizing Y µEve1 in Eq. (8). Meanwhile, to achieve a
traceless attack, the attack has to follow the same de-
tection statistics by optimizing Zµn , Z
ν
n, P (s
∣∣s), P (d∣∣s),
P (s|d) and P (d|d) for every distance value. Therefore,
it becomes an optimization problem under certain con-
straints:
min
Zµn ,Zνn;P (s|s),P (d|s)
Y µEve1 (15)
60 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
10
−8
10
−7
10
−6
10
−5
10
−4
10
−3
10
−2
10
−1
K
e
y
 r
a
te
 (
b
it
/p
u
ls
e
)
 
 
R
R
l
u
Distance (km)
FIG. 3. (Color online) The lower bound Rl and optimized
upper bound Ru of key rate under our simulated attack. The
detection parameters are taken from GYS experiment [52]:
the dark count rate Y0 = 1.7 × 10−6, the transmission in
Bob’s apparatus ηBob = 4.5%, the misalignment error rate
edetector = 3.3% and the error correction efficiency f(Eµ) =
1.22.
subject to
Qµ = QµEve ,
Qν = QνEve ,
EµQµ > EµEveQµEve ,
EνQν > EνEveQνEve ,
Zµn , Z
ν
n ∈ [0, 1],
P (s|s), P (d|s), P (s|d), P (d|d) ∈ [0, 1].
(16)
Ideally, the detection efficiency could be 100%, so the
yield Zωn could reach 1. We also remark that the prob-
abilities P (i
∣∣j) are taken from the measured probabil-
ity distribution of the states sent by Alice in Fig. 1(a).
P (s
∣∣s) and P (s∣∣d) should be taken from the time win-
dow Ws; P (d
∣∣s) and P (d∣∣d) should be taken from the
time window Wd. Importantly, since every time window
could contain several timing intervals, any observation
probabilities mentioned above should be a sum over the
time window.
The simulation result is shown in Fig. 3. To follow
the initial analysis of weak + vacuum decoy state proto-
col in Ref. 45, we also use the detection parameters from
Gobby-Yuan-Shields (GYS) experiment [52] in our attack
simulation. However, we assume the source has charac-
teristics as in Fig. 1(a); this source actually comes from
a different QKD system with the mean photon number
µ = 0.6 for the signal state and ν = 0.2 for the weak
decoy state. According to inequality (5), once the op-
timized upper bound starts becoming smaller than the
lower bound, Eve can successfully execute the PNS at-
tack. Figure 3 shows that Eve is able to successfully
hack it and eavesdrop some of the secret key when the
distance between Alice and Bob is longer than 45 km.
The attack windows Ws and Wd are optimized for ev-
ery distance point to get the lowest Ru at this distance.
For example, when the distance between Alice and Bob
is 49 km, the optimized Ws and Wd are shown as grey
zones in Fig. 1(a).
V. SECURE KEY RATE WITH IMPERFECT
SOURCE
The previous section shows the effect of partial dis-
tinguishability between signal and decoy states in the
time domain. However, the side-channel that partially
distinguishes signal and decoy states could be more gen-
eral. For example, generating signal and decoy states by
individual laser diodes is widely employed in QKD sys-
tems [32, 53, 54], even in the first quantum satellite [39].
Unfortunately, it has been shown that this type of state
preparation might leak the modulation information in
the time and frequency (spectral) domains [36]. For an-
other preparation method of one laser diode with an IM
in a plug-and-play system, Eve can shift the arriving time
of pulses to the rising edge of intensity modulation, ob-
taining a side-channel in the frequency domain in the
plug-and-play system [37]. Moreover, modulation infor-
mation of IM might be read out by an active Trojan-horse
attack [38, 40]. Even if the intensity modulation is per-
fect, the laser pulses with non-random phases give Eve a
chance to distinguish signal and decoy states [20]. There-
fore, it is important to build a general security model that
tolerates such side-channels. In this section, we modify
the model of the decoy state protocol to consider such
imperfect sources, and derive two analytic formulas that
estimate the contribution of single-photon pulses.
A. Model
We analyze the weak + vacuum decoy state protocol
with intensities ω = {µ, ν, ν1}. Without loss of generality,
we assume µ > ν > ν1 and µ > ν+ν1. Here ν1 represents
the intensity of a vacuum state.
If the imperfection of source is taken into account, the
density matrix of Alice’s states [Eq. (2)] can be rewritten
as
ρ′ω = ρω ⊗ ρω(λ) =
∞∑
n=0
∫
λ
dλPωn fω(λ)|n, λ〉〈n, λ|. (17)
Here ρω(λ) is the quantum state used by Eve to distin-
guish the signal state and the decoy state for each pulse.
Note that ρω(λ) can be an actual quantum state, or any
additional dimension of Alice’s pulses. λ represents the
parameter (for example, the time, frequency and so on)
measured by Eve, which is used to distinguish the sig-
nal state or the decoy state. fω(λ) is the normalized
7probability distribution of λ (
∫
λ
fω(λ)dλ = 1), which de-
pends on the intensities of Alice’s pulse ω. Note that if
λ is a discrete variable,
∫
dλ should be changed to
∑
λ
in Eq. (17). We assume that the measured parameter
of Eve, λ, is independent of the photon number of Al-
ice’s state, n. I.e., |n, λ〉 = |n〉|λ〉. Obviously, if ρω(λ)
is independent on the intensities of Alice’s pulse, which
means ρµ(λ) = ρν(λ) = ρν1(λ) ≡ ρ(λ), then Eq. (17)
becomes Eq. (2). Thus, the general decoy state method
can be used to estimate the bound of yield and error rate
for the single photon pulses [45].
By combining Eqs. (3) with Eq. (17), the total gain
and error rate of Alice’s states should be rewritten as
Qω =
∞∑
n=0
Pωn Y
ω
n =
∞∑
n=0
Pωn
∑
λ
fω(λ)Yn(λ),
QωEω =
∞∑
n=0
Pωn Y
ω
n e
ω
n =
∞∑
n=0
Pωn
∑
λ
fω(λ)Yn(λ)en(λ),
(18)
where Yn(λ) and en(λ) are the yield and error rate given
that Alice sends an n-photon pulse and Eve obtains λ in
her measurement. Thus Yn(λ) and en(λ) depend on the
parameter λ, but are independent on the intensities of
Alice’s pulses ω.
As Ref. 38 mentioned, the imperfection of source can
be characterized by the distance between ρω(λ) and
ρω′(λ), which is given by
Dωω′ =
1
2
tr|ρω − ρω′ |. (19)
Here tr|x| is the trace distance of quantum state.
B. Lower bound of Y µ1
Now we derive the lower bound of Y µ1 according to the
model given above. From Eq. (19), it is easy to obtain
inequalities
|Y ωn − Y ω
′
n | ≤ 2Dωω′ ,
|Y ωn eωn − Y ω
′
n e
ω′
n | ≤ 2Dωω′ ,
(20)
where ω, ω′ = µ, ν, ν1 and 1 > µ > ν > ν1 > 0. Note that
by following the proof of Ref. 38, the factor 2 in Eq. (20)
may be removed to improve the key rate.
To estimate the lower bound of Y µ1 , we follow the pro-
cedure in Ref. 45. We assume that Y µ0 = Y
ν
0 = Y
ν1
0 = Y0,
since there is no difference for the vacuum pulse and Eve
cannot get any information from such pulse. The lower
bound of Y µ1 is given by (see Appendix A for derivation)
Y µ1 ≥
µ[eνQν−eν1Qν1− ν
2−ν21
µ2 (e
µQµ−Y L0 )]
µ(ν − ν1)− (ν2 − ν21)
− g(µ, ν, ν1)
≡ G(µ, ν, ν1)− g(µ, ν, ν1).
(21)
Here,
g(µ, ν, ν1) ≡ 2µ[Dµν(e
ν − 1) +Dµν1(eν1 − 1)]
µ(ν − ν1)− (ν2 − ν21)
. (22)
It is easy to check that G(µ, ν, ν1) is the same as the
lower bound of Y µ1 in the standard decoy-state protocol
(Eq. (21) in Ref. 45), which represents the yield of the sin-
gle photon pulse with a perfect source. Thus, g(µ, ν, ν1)
represents the leaked information due to the imperfection
of source.
In general decoy state experiments, weak + vac-
uum state protocol is used, which means ν1 = 0.
Then Eq. (21) can be written as
Y µ1 ≥
µ
µν−ν2 [e
νQν−ν
2
µ2
eµQµ−µ
2−ν2
µ2
Qvac−2Dµν(eν−1)].
(23)
C. Upper bound of eµ1
The upper bound of eµ1 can be estimated by (see Ap-
pendix B for derivation)
eµ1 ≤ min{Kµ,Kν ,Kν1 ,Kµν ,Kµν1}, (24)
where
Kµ =
eµQµEµ − e0Y L0
µY µ1
,
Kν =
eνQνEν − e0Y L0 + 2νDµν
νY µ1
,
Kν1 =
eν1Qν1Eν1 − e0Y L0 + 2ν1Dµν1
ν1Y
µ
1
,
Kµν =
eµQµEµ − eνQνEν + 2Dµν(eν − 1)
(µ− ν)Y µ1
,
Kµν1 =
eµQµEµ − eν1Qν1Eν1 + 2Dµν1(eν1 − 1)
(µ− ν1)Y µ1
.
When Dµν1 = 0, Eq. (24) becomes as the same as the
upper bound of eν1 in the standard decoy-state protocol
(Eq. (25) in Ref. 45).
For weak + vacuum decoy state protocol, ν1 = 0 and
Y0 = Qvac. Then, the upper bound of e
µ
1 can be rewritten
as
eµ1 ≤ min{Kµ,Kν ,Kµν}. (25)
D. Numerical simulation
We simulate weak + vacuum decoy state protocol.
When Eve is absent, the total gain and error rate of the
signal state and the decoy state are given by Eqs. (12)
and (14). The rest of parameters follow the definition in
standard decoy state protocol [45]. Submitting Eqs. (12)
and (14) into Eqs. (23) and (25), we can obtain the lower
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Estimated system parameters with im-
perfect source. (a) yield and (b) error rate of the signal state
for the single photon pulse, and (c) key rate are shown for
different amounts of imperfection Dµν . The detection param-
eters used in the simulations are the same as those in Fig. 3.
The intensities of the signal state and the decoy state are op-
timized with step 0.01 from µ ∈ [0.01, 0.5], ν ∈ [0.01, 0.2]. We
only show the estimated Y µ1 and e
µ
1 where the final key rate
is positive. No secure key can be generated for Dµν = 10
−1
and 10−2.
bound of yield and the upper bound of error rate for the
single photon pulse as shown in Fig. 4(a) and (b). Then
the estimated key rate is given in Fig. 4(c). This clearly
shows that the imperfection of source will reduce the key
rate between Alice and Bob rapidly. For example, when
the source is perfect (Dµν = 0), the maximum distance
is about 141 km. The secure key rate estimated by our
method matches that estimated by the original decoy-
state protocol in Ref. 45, which confirms the estimation
is tight. However, the maximum distances are reduced to
124, 92, 48 km for Dµν = 10
−5, 10−4, 10−3. No positive
key rate is possible at any distance for Dµν = 10
−2, 10−1.
E. Theory improvement
From the modified security proof in the last section,
even for the relatively small imperfection Dµν = 10
−3,
the maximum secure distance drops quickly from 141 km
to 48 km. Here, we propose an advanced security proof
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Estimated key rate assuming cali-
brated transmittance in Bob’s optical devices. The detection
parameters used here are the same as those in Fig. 3.
to improve the final key rate with the imperfect source by
setting a reasonable assumption. Then we could loosen
the security constraint when estimating Y µ1 and e
µ
1 , theo-
retically improving the secure key rate and the maximum
secure distance.
In practical QKD systems based on prepare-and-
measure protocol, Bob’s devices are located within his
protected zone. Thus, it is possible for Bob to calibrate
the optical transmittance of his optical devices. Note
that here we do not mean that Eve could not change
the parameters of Bob’s system (for example, change the
SPD from Geiger mode to linear mode by performing
the blinding attack), but mean that Bob could actively
calibrate the transmittance of his partial or all devices.
In fact, this assumption has been used to secure the sin-
gle photon detector of Bob [43, 44]. Thus, we think this
assumption is reasonable and practical. We can then ob-
tain
Yn(λ) ≤ 1− (1− ηcalBob)n. (26)
Please note that ηcalBob is the calibrated transmittance in
Bob, which should be equal with or lower than the total
transmittance of Bob ηBob. In the simulation, we could
assume that Bob can calibrate the whole transmittance
in his system, thus we could have ηcalBob = ηBob. Then
Eq. (20) can be rewritten as
|Y ωn − Y ω
′
n | ≤ 2Dωω′ [1− (1− ηBob)n],
|Y ωn eωn − Y ω
′
n e
ω′
n | ≤ 2Dωω′ [1− (1− ηBob)n].
(27)
Then in weak + vacuum decoy state protocol, it is easy
to check that the lower bound of Y µ1 [Eq. (23)] and the
9upper bound of eµ1 [Eq. (25)] can be rewritten as
Y µ1 ≥
µ
µν − ν2 [e
νQν − ν
2
µ2
eµQµ − µ
2 − ν2
µ2
Y0
− 2Dµν(eν − eν(1−ηBob))],
eµ1 ≤ min{Kµ,Kν ,Kµν},where
Kµ =
eµQµEµ − e0Y0
µY µ1
,
Kν =
eνQνEν − e0Y0 + 2νDµνηBob
νY µ1
,
Kµν =
eµQµEµ − eνQνEν + 2Dµν(eν − eν(1−ηBob))
(µ− ν)Y µ1
.
(28)
Then we could estimate the final key rate with the
same method given above. The estimation result in Fig. 5
clearly shows that when the transmittance of Bob’s op-
tical devices (ηBob = 4.5%) is taken into account, the
final key rate and the maximum distance are improved.
For example, in the case that Dµν = 10
−3, the maxi-
mum distance increases to 105 km from 48 km. Also note
that for Dµν = 10
−2 and 10−1, the improved proof pro-
vides positive key rate up to 64 and 18 km. We remark
that the assumption of calibrated transmission loss for
Bob’s devices is not applicable to measurement-device-
independent QKD (MDI QKD), in which the detection
part is not in the protected zone and can be fully con-
trolled by Eve.
VI. DISCUSSION AND APPLICATION
EXAMPLES
In Sec. V, the method used to estimate Y µ1 and e
µ
1 in a
decoy state protocol considers a type of imperfect source
which could partially distinguish signal and decoy states
in any degrees of freedom. Once these imperfections are
experimentally measured, this method could provide a
standard way to calculate the final key rate under such
imperfections. Note that this method focuses on the im-
perfect modulation of signal and decoy states, but does
not handle the distinguishability among different BB84
states. We currently assume the identical mismatch of
signal and decoy states for each BB84 state. Removing
this theoretical limitation could be future work.
Another limitation lies in our experiment. We have
measured the distinguishability between signal and de-
coy states only in the time domain. However, the two
modulation methods we have tested might also introduce
time-dependent spectral mismatch, which we have not
measured. For the gain-switched semiconductor laser, a
short pulse usually has a so-called chirp, a fast-changing
wavelength modulation [55, 56]. The spectral and in-
tensity modulation contribute simultaneously to the dis-
tinguishability, resulting in a joint distribution of Dµν
as explained later in this section. The external intensity
modulator may also affect the spectrum of pulses [57, 58].
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Estimated key rate for different ex-
perimental distinguishability of signal and decoy states. The
detection parameters used here are the same as in Fig. 3.
The key rate is estimated by the initial proof with Eqs. (23)
and (25) and also the improved proof with Eq. (28). Note that
in the case of Dµν = 0.1400, no secure key can be generated
with the initial proof, but the positive key rate is possible with
our improved proof. Dµν = 0.4005 cannot generate positive
key rate in either proof.
However, the requisite time-resolved spectroscopy is a
more complex measurement [56, 59, 60], which could be
investigated in the future. For the two devices tested, we
henceforth assume distinguishability in the time domain
only.
We now apply our security proof to the measurement
results of the two sources tested in Sec. III, and to one
more published source measurement in Ref. 36. Both
the initial proof in Sec. V D and the advanced proof
in Sec. V E are applied in each case. The purpose of
this application is quantifying the imperfection of signal
and decoy states preparation, and showing its effect on
the secure key rate. In order to compare the three source
implementations, we arbitrarily assume that these differ-
ent sources are used in the same fibre-based QKD system
with GYS parameters at the detection side. The result-
ing secure key rates are shown in Fig. 6.
For the first case shown in Fig. 1(a), the corresponding
value of Dµν given by Eq. (19) is 0.4005. Then both
our security proofs are applied. For the improved proof,
we assume ηBob = 4.5%. The secure key rate is zero
under either key rate estimation. This shows that the
modulation imperfection can make the system insecure.
On the contrary, the value of Dµν for the case in Fig. 2
is only 3.6 × 10−3. This non-zero value probably stems
from the noise in our characterization apparatus. Never-
theless, we have to conservatively treat all mismatch as
belonging to the source under test. This non-zero value
of Dµν still indicates a certain degree of mismatch. As
shown in Fig. 6, under the initial proof, the maximum
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Initial mismatch of signal and decoy
states for the vertical-polarization pair of laser diodes in (a)
time domain and (b) frequency domain. The timing mismatch
can be reduced by tuning electrical delay lines in the laser
diodes’ driver. Data reprinted from Ref. 36.
distance drops to 22 km, while under the advanced proof
with ηBob = 4.5%, it improves to 83 km. I.e., owing to
the much lower mismatch in this case, the positive key
rate could be generated. However, the maximum trans-
mission distance is sensitive even to such low mismatch
values.
Another case of imperfect preparation for signal and
decoy states is published in Ref. 36. In that study, the
signal and decoy states are generated by individual laser
diodes, which is a common technique [32, 39, 53, 54]. It
shows that mismatches between signal and decoy states
are both in the time domain and frequency domain for
each individual BB84 state [36]. Because our proof can-
not handle the BB84 states individually, we have chosen
a typical mismatch between the signal and decoy states in
vertical polarization as reprinted in Fig. 7, and assumed
arbitrarily that the other three BB84 polarization states
have the mismatch identical to that. Even though Ref. 36
studies an imperfect source in a free-space QKD sys-
tem, we remark that it is reasonable to expect mismatch
for any QKD implementations that generate signal and
decoy states by individual laser diodes [32, 39, 53, 54].
Please note that Fig. 7 illustrates the initial mismatches
between two independent lasers. The timing mismatch
can be reduced by adjusting the delay between the laser
diodes [36, 61].
The security proof in Sec. V is able to handle mismatch
in arbitrary degrees of freedom, because we do not specify
the dimensions of the probability fω(λ). fω(λ) can be
a joint probability. For example, the joint probability
distribution of ω state in the time and frequency domains
can be fω(t, f), where t represents the time domain and
f represents the frequency domain. Thus, Dµν can be
defined as
Dµν =
1
2
∑
t
∑
f
|fµ(t, f)− fν(t, f)|. (29)
Similarly, the calculation of Dµν can be expanded to
more than two dimensions. In the specific case shown
in Fig. 7, time-resolved spectroscopy necessary to mea-
sure the joint probability was not performed. It has been
arbitrarily assumed instead that the probability distri-
butions in the time and frequency domains are indepen-
dent, with a remark that this will need to be verified
experimentally [36]. Then, fω(t, f) = fω(t)fω(f) can be
calculated from the available experimental data. The cor-
responding Dµν is 0.1400. With such value of Dµν , the
initial security proof cannot generate positive key rate for
any distance, while the improved proof with ηBob = 4.5%
could generate the secure key up to only 10 km, as shown
in Fig. 6.
According to the above analysis and comparison of the
three cases, the external intensity modulator shows the
smallest mismatch between signal and decoy states, re-
sulting in the highest key rate and longest transmission
distance. However, Trojan-horse attack could read out
the modulation information from the intensity modula-
tor [38, 40]. Thus, countermeasures against Trojan-horse
attack are also necessary [62, 63]. The use of inten-
sity modulator may also result in non-zero vacuum state,
which can be handled by our security proof. The secure
key rate can then be estimated by applying Eqs. (21)
and (24).
All the measurement results shown above contain a
measurement error. The error may come from the
thermal noise of electronic devices, the nonlinearity of
optical-to-electrical converters and digital-to-analog con-
verters in the oscilloscope. We have simply treated the
measured Dµν as the real mismatch. Thus, the key rates
shown in Fig. 6 are conservative estimates. It is an open
question how to extract the real parameter from the noisy
test results.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have investigated the imperfect
sources in QKD systems that implement the decoy state
protocol. By testing two intensity modulation methods,
we have found that the basic assumption about indistin-
guishability of signal and decoy states does not hold in
practice, especially in the case of laser diode pump cur-
rent modulation. This pump-current modulation shows
timing mismatch between the signal and decoy states.
We have modeled a PNS attack based on the timing
mismatch that breaks the security of the QKD system.
To make the system robust against this loophole, we
have considered the distinguishability of signal and decoy
states in the security proof, and obtained two analytical
formulas to estimate the yield and error rate of the single
photon pulses. The result shows that the distinguisha-
bility would reduce the secure key rate. Fortunately, the
key rate under such imperfection can be improved by cali-
brating the transmittance of Bob’s unit. We have applied
this method to three implementations of the decoy state
protocol to estimate their secure key rate, which in some
cases has become reduced (also limiting the transmission
distance), and in some just zero.
The estimation of Y µ1 and e
µ
1 with the distinguishable
decoy state provides a method to guarantee the secu-
rity of practical quantum cryptography systems. This
method could be employed as a standard tool to esti-
mate the secure key rate, once the distinguishability in
the decoy state protocol is quantified in all degrees of
freedom. A conceptually similar evaluation method has
been proposed for the Trojan-horse attack [62]. Please
note that the key rate shown in this work is based on
prepare-and-measure QKD. For MDI QKD and the other
quantum cryptography systems, the secure key rate and
the other security properties under such imperfect source
model should be derived separately.
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Appendix A: Estimating the lower bound of Y µ1
Firstly, the lower bound of background rate Y0 is esti-
mated by the following.
νeν1Qν1 − ν1eνQν =
∞∑
n=0
1
n!
(ννn1 Y
ν1
n − ν1νnY νn )
= (ν − ν1)Y0 +
∞∑
n=1
νν1
n!
(νn−11 Y
ν1
n − νn−1Y νn )
≤ (ν − ν1)Y0 +
∞∑
n=1
νν1
n!
[νn−11 (Y
µ
n + 2Dµν1)− νn−1(Y µn − 2Dµν)]
= (ν − ν1)Y0 +
∞∑
n=1
[2Dµν1
νν1
n!
νn−11 + 2Dµν
νν1
n!
νn−1 +
νν1
n!
(νn−11 − νn−1)Y µn ]
= (ν − ν1)Y0 + 2Dµν1ν(eν1 − 1) + 2Dµνν1(eν − 1)− νν1
∞∑
n=1
νn−1 − νn−11
n!
Y µn
≤ (ν − ν1)Y0 + 2Dµν1ν(eν1 − 1) + 2Dµνν1(eν − 1)
≡ (ν − ν1)Y0 + g′(µ, ν, ν1).
(A1)
Note that νn−1 − νn−11 ≥ 0 is used above. Thus, from inequality (A1), we can get the lower bound of Y0
Y0 ≥ Y L0 = max{
1
ν − ν1 [νe
ν1Qν1 − ν1eνQν − g′(µ, ν, ν1)], 0}. (A2)
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Then, we can estimate the lower bound of Y1 as shown below.
eνQν − eν1Qν1 =
∞∑
n=0
νn
n!
Y νn −
∞∑
n=0
νn1
n!
Y ν1n
= Y ν0 − Y ν10 + νY ν1 − ν1Y ν11 +
∞∑
n=2
1
n!
(νnY νn − νn1 Y ν1n )
≤ ν(Y µ1 + 2Dµν)− ν1(Y µ1 − 2Dµν1) +
∞∑
n=2
1
n!
[νn(Y µn + 2Dµν)− νn1 (Y µn − 2Dµν1)]
= (ν − ν1)Y µ1 + 2νDµν + 2ν1Dµν1 +
∞∑
n=2
1
n!
[(νn − νn1 )Y µn + 2νnDµν + 2νn1Dµν1 ]
= (ν − ν1)Y µ1 +
∞∑
n=2
1
n!
(νn − νn1 )Y µn + 2Dµν(eν − 1) + 2Dµν1(eν1 − 1)
≤ (ν − ν1)Y µ1 +
ν2 − ν21
µ2
(eµQµ − Y L0 − µY µ1 ) +
µ(ν − ν1)− (ν2 − ν21)
µ
g(µ, ν, ν1)
=
µ(ν − ν1)− (ν2 − ν21)
µ
Y µ1 +
ν2 − ν21
µ2
(eµQµ − Y L0 ) +
µ(ν − ν1)− (ν2 − ν21)
µ
g(µ, ν, ν1).
(A3)
Here we use the inequality
νn−νn1
µn ≤ ν
2−ν21
µ2 for all n ≥ 2
and Y L0 is given by Eq. (A2). In Eq. (A3),
g(µ, ν, ν1) ≡ 2µ[Dµν(e
ν − 1) +Dµν1(eν1 − 1)]
µ(ν − ν1)− (ν2 − ν21)
. (A4)
We assume µ ≥ ν + ν1. By solving inequality (A3), the
lower bound of Y µ1 is given by
Y µ1 ≥
µ[eνQν−eν1Qν1− ν
2−ν21
µ2 (e
µQµ−Y L0 )]
µ(ν − ν1)− (ν2 − ν21)
− g(µ, ν, ν1)
≡ G(µ, ν, ν1)− g(µ, ν, ν1).
(A5)
For the weak + vacuum decoy state protocol, it is easy
to get the lower bound of Y0 from Eq. (A2). That is
Y L0 = Qν1=0 = Qvac. Then Eq. (A5) can be written as
Y µ1 ≥
µ
µν−ν2 [e
νQν−ν
2
µ2
eµQµ−µ
2−ν2
µ2
Qvac−2Dµν(eν−1)].
(A6)
Appendix B: Estimating the upper bound of eµ1
We derive the upper bound of eµ1 as follows. Note the
fact that
eωQωEω =
∞∑
n=0
ωn
n!
Y ωn e
ω
n ≥ e0Y0 + ωY ω1 eω1 , (B1)
Thus, we have
eµ1 ≤
eµQµEµ − e0Y L0
µY µ1
≡ Kµ, (B2a)
eµ1 ≤
eν1Y
ν
1 + 2Dµν
Y µ1
≤ e
νQνEν − e0Y L0 + 2νDµν
νY µ1
≡ Kν ,
(B2b)
eµ1 ≤
eν11 Y
ν1
1 + 2Dµν1
Y µ1
≤ e
ν1Qν1Eν1 − e0Y L0 + 2ν1Dµν1
ν1Y
µ
1
≡ Kν1 .
(B2c)
At the same time, we have
QµEµe
µ −QνEνeν
=
∞∑
n=0
[
µn
n!
Y µn e
m
n u−
µn
n!
Y µn e
m
n u]
= uY µ1 e
µ
1 − νY ν1 eν1 +
∞∑
n=2
µnY µn e
µ
n − νY νn eνn
n!
≥ (µ− ν)Y µ1 eµ1 − 2Dµν(ν +
∞∑
n=2
νn
n!
) +
∞∑
n=2
µn − νn
n!
Y µn e
µ
n
= (µ− ν)Y µ1 eµ1 − 2Dµν(eν − 1).
(B3)
Here we use the fact that Y µ0 = Y
ν
0 and e
µ
0 = e
ν
0 , since
there is no difference for the vacuum pulse. Then we have
eµ1 ≤
eµQµEµ − eνQνEν + 2Dµν(eν − 1)
(µ− ν)Y µ1
≡ Kµν . (B4)
Similarly, we have
eµ1 ≤
eµQµEµ − eν1Qν1Eν1 + 2Dµν1(eν1 − 1)
(µ− ν1)Y µ1
≡ Kµν1 .
(B5)
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Therefore, the upper bound of eµ1 can be estimated by
eµ1 ≤ min{Kµ,Kν ,Kν1 ,Kµν ,Kµν1}. (B6)
For weak + vacuum decoy state protocol, ν1 = 0 and
Y0 = Qvac. Then Qν1Eν1 = e0Y0. Inequality (B2c) be-
comes
eµ1 ≤
1
Y µ1
, (B7)
which holds by the definition of e1. Also, K
µν1 = Kµ.
Thus, the upper bound of eµ1 can be rewritten as
eµ1 ≤ min{Kµ,Kν ,Kµν}. (B8)
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